Excerpt Of The Day

This passage is drawn from page 148 of David Halberstam's truly excellent book on the US-Vietnam war called The Best and the Brightest. The passage concerns the South Vietnamese leader Diem, and how support for him within the upper echelons of the US government morphed from tepid in the 1950s to something greater later. It describes how that transformation, and the attendant heavier footprint of the US in Vietnam, took place:

It was a shaky basis on which to found a policy, but it did not seem like a major decision at the time, nor a major policy. The attitude was essentially that there was little to lose, a certain small investment in American money, virtually no investment in American lives. In the beginning there was little illusion about the legitimacy of the [Diem] government, or the state, or its chances for survival. That illusion would come gradually, later on, for a commitment is a subtle thing, with a life of its own and a rhythm of its own. It may, as in the case of South Vietnam, begin as something desperately frail, when the chances for survival are negligible. For a while, oxygen is breathed in, mouth-to-mouth, at great effort but little cost, and then the very people who have been administering the oxygen, desperate to keep the commitment alive (not because they believe in any hopeful prognosis, but because they do not want to be charged with failing to try and give first aid), look up one day and find that there is indeed a faint pulse, that the patient is more alive than dead. But at this point they are not relieved of their responsibility; instead, for the first the commitment really begins, and now they are charged with keeping it alive. It is a responsibility, it is real. Its death would mean genuine political repercussions.

No deep point here. Just wanted to share a really nicely written paragraph.

How Insufferable Are New Yorkers?

Well, the short answer, for me anyway, is "very".

There's a little discussion going around in the blogosphere on how annoying, if at all, New York and New Yorkers are. What started it off was this post by Conor Friedersdorf:

Even if New York is a peerless American city, an urban triumph that dwarfs every other in scale, density, and possibility; even if our idea of it is the romantic notion that Joan Didion described, "the mysterious nexus of all love and money and power, the shining and perishable dream itself;" even if you've reveled in the fact of the city, strutting down Fifth Avenue in a sharp suit or kissing a date with the skyline as backdrop while the yellow cab waits; even if you've drunk from the well of its creative springs, gazing at the Flatiron Building, or paging through the New York Review of Books on a Sunday morning, or living vicariously through Joseph Mitchel or E.B. White or Tom Wolfe or any of its countless chroniclers; even if you love New York as much as I do, revering it as the highest physical achievement of Western Civilization, surely you can admit that its singularly prominent role on the national scene is a tremendously unhealthy pathology.

Despite the rent, the cold, the competition, the bedbugs, the absurd requirements for securing even a closet-sized pre-war apartment on an inconvenient street; the distance from friends and family, the starkness of the sexual marketplace, the oppressive stench of sticky subway platforms in the dog days of August; despite the hour long commutes on the Monday morning F Train, when it isn't quite 8 am, the week hardly underway, and already you feel as though, for the relief of sitting down, you'd just as soon give up, go back to Akron or Allentown or Columbus or Marin County or Long Beach -- despite these things, and so many more, lawyers and novelists and artists and fashion designers and playwrights and journalists and bankers and aspiring publishers and models flock to New York City.

And then Andrew Sullivan jumped in:

I love it to death, but would never live there. And the narcissism of its inhabitants (yes, I know I'm not exactly one to talk) is deeply irritating. It's much less different than it once was; and nowhere near as interesting as it believes.

At which Ezra Klein stepped in:

New Yorkers, by contrast, have what's considered the greatest city in the country and can't stop talking about it. It's like an A-student bragging about his grades, or a rich guy making everybody look at his car. It's unseemly.

And finally, Ta-Nehisi Coates, who says it's all about the sheer numbers:

I think it's hard to get what happens when you slam millions of people who are really different into close proximity. It's incredible to watch. I think that's only smug if you're the kind of person to attribute accidents of environment and history, to genetics.

Moreover, I think New Yorkers only seem more smug, because there are more people in New York and thus more arrogant New Yorkers. In my time, I have watched mo-fos from everywhere from Dallas to Cleveland to Columbia, Maryland hold forth about why their neck of the woods is touched by God. This kind of person would be that way, no matter where he or she were born. Regrettably, in New York we have more of those kinds of people, because we have more of all kinds of people. It's worth remembering the sheer population size of the city--it's like ten Detroits.

My view on this is fairly simple: I love New York but I fucking hate New Yorkers.

You see, New York is a fantastic city. It's got great restaurants. Great attractions. Great nightlife. Great comedy. Great buzz. When you visit New York, you feel a thrill -- it's like being part of something bigger. And for me, personally, New York will always have a special place in my heart. The woman I married spent five years in the city, four as a college student, and for that reason alone, I love it; the memories of visiting it are invariably happy ones.

But my problem is this: New Yorkers believe that they have a monopoly on living in a cool place. Now, please understand this is not some Chicago-New York rivalry thing playing out. Frankly, I consider neither of these cities home, and couldn't care less what inhabitants of each city think of each other.

But it is quite instructive that New Yorkers believe they are sui generis; they are special and unique for living in a place like New York. They really do believe that they have the best of everything (untrue) and that no one is as hip or cool as them (also, sadly, untrue).

What's more is that New Yorkers think what makes them cooler and better than everyone else is the fact that they live in New York. It's circular reasoning taken to absurd lengths. Why is New York cool, you ask? Well, because of New Yorkers. And what makes New Yorkers so special? New York!

Shut up. Please, just shut up.

Look, I have many friends in New York. I try to visit at least once a year because of the number of friends I have there. I would love to live there one day, if I could afford it. But honestly, New Yorkers need to get a grip. More than that, they need to get over themselves.

It should be made mandatory for New Yorkers to spend some time in other big cities, both in the U.S. and abroad, just to understand how non-special they really are, and just how non-special their city really is. You want culture and art? Walk around Montparnasse in Paris during the early evening, or maybe around le Marais. You want down and dirty, hipster neighborhoods with local markers and weed sellers? Go to Camden in London. You want neon signs? Walk around downtown Tokyo, where it's brighter at night than during the day. Hustle and bustle? Las Ramblas in Barcelona.

But New Yorkers don't know any of this, or pretend not to know. For them, the world begins and ends at the boundaries of the 8000 bridges and tunnels connecting New York to the rest of the world. And it's really annoying. I get that you're proud of your city, and like living there. But open your goddamn eyes and ears, just for a second. And if that's too hard, then at least do us the favor of closing your mouth.

Money Isn't Everything Mr. Hamid

I couldn't agree more with Ahsan's preceding post, Mohsin Hamid is dead wrong when he assumes that an increase in taxes would rid us of our ills. As Ahsan points out, the problem lies in how the taxes are spent not in how much money is available - this is actually exemplified by how our are collected, we pay very little into our provincial and local government and I'm pretty sure that any increase in the tax revenue is likely to flow into the federal government.

Over the past 10 days I've run around the United States meeting people from each pillar of the government, and the thing that's really struck me is just how complicated the American system of government really is. There is a three tier system of governance: federal, state and local, governed by federal, state and local laws and funded by federal, state and local laws. "This is a state that is designed to create eternal internal tension" says an American federal judge, a contender for the spot on the Supreme Court.

If the American system creates tension, the Pakistani system creates acquiescence. In Pakistan we have this one giant Military-Executive pillar, that rules over us, governs us through its laws and rules and is funded through our money. And to claim that the Pakistani judiciary is strong after the lawyers movement is to not really understand the rule of law and justice. A powerful Chief Justice doesn't mean you have a strong judiciary, it means you have a powerful chief justice willing to exercise his constitutional authority, nothing more.

I am awe struck by the strength of the American judicial system. The true power of the American judicial system results from it being separate from the other branches of government in a manner that is unheard of in almost any other country. Over 90% of the litigation occurring in the United States takes place in state courts, and many of these judges (varies from state to state) are elected. Imagine that, an elected judge.

In Pakistan, our judiciary is still born and weak beyond compare. And its not just a matter of resources, the Asian Development Bank recently gave a huge grant to Pakistan to help the country improve its judicial system. The money was spent in raising the salaries of judges and court staff, sprucing up buildings and buying computers (most of which lie idle). Our government officials / administrators / judges weren't insincere, nor did they misappropriate the money, they didn't know what to do with the money. This ties into what Ahsan termed as "State Capacity." Pakistan is so ill formed as a state that its pillars of government do not really understand what they are supposed to do even when they have the resources.

I've always been quick to pass judgment on our government officials but that's not fair, there are severe institutional constraints placed on our officials. Almost everyday a lawyer at our firm will criticize a judge of the High Court for being incompetent - and many of these judges may well be incompetent. But we fail to realize how little help our judges have. In the United States judges have an extensive staff of professionals including court clerks (comprising of law graduates from the top American universities), they can rely on organizations such as the National Center for State Courts, this is a system of justice not just a lineup of judges.

We can raise our taxes and we can pump in money into the government but until the Pakistani state straightens out its priorities and begins to understand what a government, what a state, is supposed to do we won't have a brighter future.

Video Of The Day

Via Andrew Sullivan, this is brilliant. Conan with subtitles.

Conan O'Brien's 60 Minutes Inner Monologue - watch more funny videos

The End Of The Road For "The Office"?

Ta-Nehisi Coates is not going to watch "The Office" anymore, and I can't say I blame him.

There's two basic ways in which a show stops being funny, and it really depends on what type of show it is. If it is a show in which there one superstar carrying the load, and he/she is basically the only reason it is funny, then the show will stop being funny the day you get sick of that person's shtick. It's not that that person ceases to be funny, it's just that you no longer find it tolerable that you have to wade through all that other crap just to get to one person doing their thing, and that becomes that. This is what happened to "Entourage" for me -- I loved Ari, but honestly, three years of "super-intense, always yelling, endearing but kind of a dick" was enough. The same thing has already happened with Barney in "How I Met Your Mother" and the same thing will happen with Sheldon and "The Big Bang Theory" in about a year, you watch. It's just a matter of time.

The second type of show that stops being funny is when writers decide there's nothing left to say, so they make it a soap opera and try to make it a 30-min chick flick every week. This, by the way, is also called "the Friends syndrome", named after a show that was exceedingly funny until they decided to make Monica and Chandler a serious couple rather than a humorous (and transient) sideshow. By the time Joey fell for Rachel, the show had just fallen off the deep end. Did we really need lovey-dovey stuff over and above the interminable Ross-and-Rachel crap? I think not. Think back to when "Frasier" became boring -- not a coincidence that it happened to be around the time Niles and Daphne became an item, is it? I don't know how else to put it: love is bad for comedy. Romantic tension? Funny. Romance? Cringe-worthy.

A little of both have happened to "The Office". It's become a little too Jim-and-Pam-y for my liking, and Michael Scott is beginning to annoy me too. It's done, and it had a great run. But it's not even the funniest mockumentary on NBC on Thursday nights anymore. That, my friends, is "Parks and Recreation".

Thanks, CTA!

We're into day three of the Chicago Transit Authority's service cuts, and let me tell you, the first two days sucked.

Here's the background: the CTA has been losing money since, basically, forever. Because it loses money, it must (a) make more money, or (b) spend less money. Usually, we get (a). Last year, for instance, the CTA raised fares 25 cents across the board, which may not sound like much, but think about this: in what other facet of life are you supposed to accept quietly a 12.5% increase in the price of something which you use twice a day, every day?

Alternatively, instead of charging consumers more, we also regularly get treated to this inane dance between the CTA, the city government and the Illinois government, whereby the CTA starts throwing tantrums, says they're going to cut back services, and then waits for one of the city or the state legislature to fold and give it oodles of money. This happens all the time.

Except this time, nobody stepped in, and the CTA actually cut back services. And they didn't just cut back services, they cut back services in the middle of winter. I never thought commuting could be a near death experience, but the Chicago weather and the longer wait times for the bus now means it's a fairly realistic possibility.

Anyways, Mayor Daley says there's no end in sight to the cuts, which is just great. Thanks, CTA! You're the best.

By the way, if one of our readers would like to be nice and buy me (and the W, don't forget her) a car, now would be a good time. You'd also have to pony up for two parking spots near our place. Let me know if you're up for it.

Jon Stewart Vs. Bill O'Reilly

You know, for all of O'Reilly's condescension and inability to see basic facts for what they are, this is was actually a pretty fun interview. I think what this shows -- similar to Obama's Q&A with Republican members of the House last week -- is that soundbyte-sized interviews are always stupid. I mean, when you know you have a five or seven minute time limit, you're going to be dealing in talking points, and not really venture from prepared positions. You're not, in other words, going to think. It's the difference between studying for an exam by rote and studying for it by really getting into the material.

This was forty five minutes of good fun. I advise watching it.

Yemen On Lather, Rinse, Repeat Cycle

The security-policymaking community in the U.S. works in very predictable ways. Any time a country no one in the U.S. is really familiar with comes up in the news due to some plausible connection to organized terrorism, the following things happen:

1. There is indignation and disgust directed at the government du jour. Government du jour, you see, has been concentrating on Country X With Lots Of Brown People for the longest time, but what it has missed is that Country Y -- which, incidentally, also has Lots Of Brown People -- is also crucial to the war on terrorism.

2. People who have no idea about Country Y With Lots Of Brown People suddenly feel the need to opine on it. This, by the way, is the most entertaining step -- as long as you're not from Country Y With Lots Of Brown People. Nothing is funnier than watching an entire industry of pundits, writers, op-edders, think tankers, cable news invitees, foreign policy "experts" and bloggers pretend to know what the fuck they're talking about.

Of course, if you happen to be from Country Y With Lots Of Brown People, you begin to get worried, because any time the American punditocracy starts talking about you, only bad things happen. This is why I cried myself hoarse during the Pakistan hysteria in the middle of last year, and why I am thoroughly enjoying the Yemen hysteria now.

3. Suddenly, a split emerges, not so much between the right and left, but between the "Wait, hang on a minute, what're we talking about again"ists and the "Bombs away!"ists. The "Bombs away!"ists have never seen a problem that American military action can't solve. Afghanistan? Send it back to the stone age. Saddam Hussein? Invade. Iran? Nuke it. Pakistan? Drone and special ops it to death. Yemen? Hell, we don't know, but do something!

Sometimes their "policy prescriptions" are heeded and sometimes they are not, but remember that the first rule of membership to the "Bombs away"ists crowd is that some form of military action -- really, anything will do -- will help solve the problem. The second rule for them is that not using military action will make the problem so much worse in the future that countless millions of lives in America will be tragically lost. Act now, or run the risk of being forever in regret.

4. People in power have to respond to step 3, which has shifted the contours of the debate significantly toward crazyland. It makes the new "moderate" position anything but, because "moderate" becomes defined by the split between the two extremes in the debate when it should actually be defined in terms of actual conditions on the ground. As an example, consider being on the edge of a cliff, and having two advisers. One tells you to jump. The other tells you to jump, but to untie your shoelaces. Do you know what the moderate position becomes?

Your death. With one shoe untied.

5. The "moderate" position, because it includes some form of intervention, is advanced in policy circles as sensible and wise. It mostly makes things worse, but the important thing to realize, you silly goose, is how much worse things would've been had Moderate Position MP not been advanced in Country Y With Lots Of Brown People. Everyone is patted on the back, until...

6. Country Z With Lots Of Brown People is in the news, because something bad happened there.

Lather, rinse, repeat.

Three TV Thoughts

First, President Obama is postponing his first State of the Union speech because of...the season premiere of "Lost". I think I now have all the evidence I need that the U.S. is a truly batshit country.

Second, check out this scathing piece in Slate on NBC's decision to revamp its late night schedule five months after it last changed it. Quick summary: a few years ago, NBC made plans to phase out Jay Leno of the Tonight Show in the coveted 11:30 p.m. slot, and give it to Conan. But instead of retiring Leno, they tried to have it both ways, by moving him up one hour too -- to 10pm, when he'd be against regular shows, rather than late night talk shows. NBC hoped to have the best of both worlds: have Conan be competitive against Letterman at 11:30, and have Leno be a cheaper and more profitable show relative to the competition at 10.

Well, that's how it worked out, except exactly the opposite. Conan is losing to Letterman, and Leno is proving highly unpopular at the new slot (getting beaten by reruns of CSI:Miami for the love of God), so much so that local NBC affiliates are complaining that he provides sucky lead-in ratings for their news shows. So now NBC is taking yet more half-measures: moving Leno back to 11:30, but only for a half-hour show, and having Conan move to midnight. Conan, for obvious reason, is pissed: he was promised the Tonight Show, and now appears that he will have the show, just not at the time he thought it would be. As Bill Simmons said in a tweet, "If I were Conan O'Brien, I would have the Masturbating Bear as my only guest for an hour every night until NBC fired me."

Third, I just watched a re-run of an old South Park episode. I had forgotten about this clip, but it's pure genius. As is Cartman. An evil genius to be sure, but a genius nonetheless.

What Do Brit Hume And Mohammad Yousuf Have In Common?

Well, it's certainly not a sweet cover drive, though in all fairness, I've never seen ol' Brit play cricket.

No, I'm referring to their proclivity to evangelize when the situation really, really does not call for it. Here's Brit Hume telling Tiger Woods to convert to Christianity because, you know, he cheated on his wife and stuff, and he needs to find a redemptive faith (no, seriously).



And this is what Yousuf was up to last month in New Zealand:

Yousuf told people there that he tries to preach Islam on his cricket tours abroad, saying that he invited top cricketers like West Indian great Brian Lara and New Zealand captain Daniel Vettori in a bid to provide them with a better understanding of Islam.

“We had a session with Brian Lara when he came to Pakistan and told him things about Islam he didn’t know,” said the Pakistan captain, who began his cicketing career as a Christian but converted to Islam in 2005 changing his name from Yousuf Youhana to Mohammad Yousuf.

“When we were in New Zealand last month, I invited Vettori for a similar session,” he said.

Sigh.

The Backlash Against "Crash"

Ta-Nehisi Coates is pissed:

Before we go any further, I need to admit that several people who I love and respect actually like Crash. I need let them know that I don't hold this against them, and I still love and respect them--though, with Crash in mind, more the former than the latter.

With that said, I don't think there's a single human being in Crash. Instead you have arguments and propaganda violently bumping into each other, impressed with their own quirkiness. ("Hey look, I'm a black carjacker who resents being stereotyped.") But more than a bad film, Crash, which won an Oscar (!), is the apotheosis of a kind of unthinking, incurious, nihilistic, multiculturalism. To be blunt, nothing tempers my extremism more than watching a fellow liberal exhort the virtues of Crash.

If you're angry about race, but not particularly interested in understanding why, you probably like Crash. If you're black and believe in the curative qualities of yet another "dialogue around race," you probably liked Crash. If you're white and voted for Barack Obama strictly because he was black, you probably liked Crash. If you've ever used the term "post-racial" or "post-black" in a serious conversation, without a hint of irony, you probably liked Crash.

And I swear if any of you defend the film, I'm going to ban you. Not just from this site, not just from the Internet, but from all public life. Don't test me. My armies are legion.

My own view is that "Crash" was a decent movie but not great. The acting was really good (especially by Don Cheadle). The soundtrack was amazing. But the writing and roles were so predictable and stupid that I wanted to cry. I mean, L.A. is a city of, what, 5 million people? And we're supposed to believe that the same eight people keeping running into each other in all these different contexts? Please.

Look, I'm all for trying to tackle issues like race, family, class and the like through film. But don't be amateur about it. Don't give me a story on race that a high school junior would come up with for her social studies class. How this movie won an Oscar is completely beyond me.

But like I said, the soundtrack was brilliant.

Kicking Donatello Out Of The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles?

That's what Yglesias wants to do:

My family took me to the Met a bunch when I was a kid. I’ve been to pretty much all of Western Europe’s super-obvious famous museums. And it’s just clear that Donatello doesn’t have the star power of the other three.

My suggestion as a replacement turtle would be Titian. He doesn’t quite have the blockbuster appeal of the other three, but no one does, and I think he comes closest. I also think he chronologically matches the other better. I suppose the counterargument would be that he’s Venetian and the others are Florentine, but it’s all Italy to the kids.

My biggest problem with the Ninja Turtles was that Shredder never, ever, EVER won. Even as a kid, I always had a soft spot for the underdog, even if they were the bad guy. Why can't they let the bad guy win sometimes? He'll get his ass kicked in the next episode anyway, so it doesn't actually mean anything. I mean, even Tom got some good shots in at the rat Jerry, so why can't Shredder ever come out on top?

Reaction To The Scahill Piece On Blackwater Part III: Dangerous Overstretch

This is the third and final post in a series of reactions to the Jeremy Scahill's investigative piece on Blackwater in Pakistan. In the first post, I dealt with the fact that Scahill's story was exclusively based on anonymous sources, and how that fact impacts its credibility. In the second post, I tackled the Pakistani angle, and talked about Pakistani security, politics and sovereignty. In this post, I write on the American angle, and the concerns the Scahill piece represents.

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Last week, the New York Times carried another investigative news article on the role of Blackwater. The article's contents were important but unsurprising, especially given all we have discovered in recent weeks. Essentially, Blackwater employees took part in raids with the CIA in both Iraq and Afghanistan, not just blurring the line between state and non state actors in war, but wholly obliterating it.

I want to make a few points. First, the rise of Blackwater's operational role speaks loudly to the overreach of executive power in the Bush White House. The Scahill piece makes clear that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the one who pushed hard for JSOC (under the stewardship of Stanley McChrystal) taking a greater burdens on the ground in America's numerous wars. Why did he do this? Because when approaching the commander of Special Forces, Rumsfeld (and Dick Cheney, no doubt) did not like what they heard in terms of the extent to which their dictates would be followed. So they simply bypassed Special Ops, and built a parallel relationship with JSOC -- outside the purview of Special Ops. As usual, when it came to Rummie and Cheney, if there wasn't a way to do what they wanted legally and through the proper channels, they created their own law and modus operandi.

Second, both the NYT and the Scahill piece speak to a disturbing example of the old revolving door problem. Usually, the revolving door speaks to people working in the private sector and then switching to a government job overseeing that sector (or vice versa). So for example, we can consider Dick Cheney hopping from Halliburton to the Vice Presidency. For obvious reasons to do with conflicts of interest, the revolving door is not very popular. But what the NYT and Scahill pieces show that it is very applicable to the military world too, an area in which you would expect the lines between government and private sectors to be most stark. For instance, we are told that Blackwater's operational staff is essentially populated by ex-CIA and ex-JSOC people who simply wanted more money. Indeed, this is why Blackwater proved to be the agency of choice for the respective government agencies; they were essentially hiring their erstwhile colleagues in different uniforms.

Third, at a macro level, the widespread use of Blackwater says something about how thin the U.S. is stretched. It is clear that the U.S.'s goals and means are simply not aligned; it wants to do more than it can. It is now in three theaters of conflict -- Iraq, Afghanistan, and yes, Pakistan. With its enormous budget deficit, a military that is continually lowering its recruitment standards to meet requirements, and burgeoning problems on the domestic front (healthcare, education), the government is forced to rely on private sector agents to do its dirty work on the ground. That should tell the U.S. something: either do less country-hopping around the world, or make more money and tax your citizens more. You can't have it both ways.
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My apologies for taking so long to get the third post out; I've just been insanely busy. I know it wasn't exactly worth the wait -- some priceless insights are contained above, I know -- but I did want to get my thoughts out there. Suffice it to say, I think this is one of the more dangerous developments to take place in war as practice in recent times. Conversely, as a student of international relations and war, the ever-expanding role of private contractors presents a number of questions for theorists of war and security studies. I actually have a friend here at Chicago who has done research on private militaries, and I would ask him to write a guest post for us, but he recently became a dad, so I doubt he'll oblige.

"The Paks"?

If this Dawn report is to be believed, that's the word U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to describe us. To be fair, it does save the trouble of three additional syllables.

By the way, it's obviously true that "Paki" is a racially charged term -- especially in Britain -- but what about "Pak"? I've never even heard it, to be honest.

Strategy And War In Pakistan And Afghanistan: Some Questions

On the heels of today's devastating attack in Lahore, which killed 45 people and injured about one hundred, we were treated to a front page article in the NYT that would be of interest to many Pakistanis. The article describes the Obama administration's efforts to cajole the Pakistan government and military to "do more". In essence, the message that has been delivered is: do the job, or get out of the way. The administration has explicitly threatened drone strikes in Quetta and boots on the ground in FATA if Pakistan doesn't act against those actors that threaten Afghanistan and allied forces, but not Pakistan directly. On cue, the NYT editorial page joins in the fun, and urges Pakistani military and civilian leaders to realize that this war is for the nation's survival, and that more must be done in confronting the so-called Afghan Taliban. Well, I love a good lecture from the NYT any time I can get one, so I'm grateful for that. But let's deal with some of the questions that this set of events has engendered.

1. What exactly will it take for opinion-makers and decision-makers in the West to draw a connection between their strategies and the enormous physical toll on Pakistan? To be clear, I am not arguing for or against particular strategies. What am I arguing for is a comprehensive evaluation of the implications of various theories of war and conflict. The NYT and Obama administration both have a theory of this war, and that's fine; everybody does, and who's to say, prima facie, who's right and who's wrong? But surely -- surely -- there should be some allusion to what Pakistanis are going through right now? Some signal that the some two and half thousand deaths in the last two years, the nearly five hundred dead in the last two months, somehow, some way, factor into the calculus?

The NYT editorial comes close, when discussing why the military doesn't strike against the Taliban in Balochistan when it says "In part, they are hesitating because of legitimate fears of retaliation." But why, pray tell, are these fears legitimate? Doesn't the NYT bear some responsibility for educating its readers to explain what real retaliation looks like? Real numbers, perhaps? This is not a minor quibble, though it may look like it is to outsiders because I am picking apart at a sentence or two in an entire editorial. The central point remains that people simply have no clue about the lives lost in this war in Pakistan. So let me help you with that:

AFP/Arif Ali

AP/K.M. Chaudary

AP/K.M. Chaudary

There are no candlelight vigils, no Facebook groups, and no Fareed Zakaria specials for Pakistani victims of militant violence. To some extent, this is the result of image problems. Pakistan is a "bad actor" in the international system, and as such, deserves little sympathy. After all, wasn't it Pakistan itself that gave rise to these groups in the first place? Indeed it was. But it is a strange moral and strategic compass that blames women and children shopping at Moon Market for the sins of GHQ and the ISI.

2. Do people understand that Balochistan is an entire problem unto itself? Newsflash, brainiacs at the NYT editorial board: there has been a low level civil war simmering in Balochistan since 2004. This follows the medium level civil war in Balochistan in the mid 1970s. Both times, the military went in, and both times, as the Pakistani military is wont to do, there wasn't a great deal of demonstrated concern for collateral damage.

The people of Balochistan have been denied basic political and economic rights, both by the central government and their nationalist so-called leaders for fifty years now. The last month has seen significant developments in this conflict, with the center -- in the hands of the PPP -- presenting a reform package aimed at placating Balochi nationalism, without much success (at least at this early juncture). If you opened a Pakistani newspaper in the last thirty days, you would know this. It has dominated the news, even more so than the Taliban war.

Why do I bring this up? Because launching drone strikes in Balochistan, and the inevitable civilian casualties that will result, will exacerbate this problem in very serious and predictable ways. I feel stupid even writing this. But apparently it is needed.

Here's how it will play out: Balochi grievances will congeal into both an anti-Pakistan narrative and an anti-anti-Taliban one. The storyline will be that the state has sold out Balochi land to foreign forces, when it wasn't even theirs to sell. Balochistan has long chafed under the hard-nosed attitude of Pakistani central governments, both military and civilian, toward provincial autonomy and federalism. Can you imagine how it will react if and when Pakistan gives the go-ahead for American drones to strike in Quetta? Or even less ambitiously, can you imagine the military making a foray into Balochistan again? At this time?

I don't mean to be rude, but for fuck's sake, NYT, get a goddamn clue.

3. Are the Obama administration's ultimatums empty threats? I have to say, upon reading the news article for the first time, that's what I thought. Why? Because surely they know that they cannot do either of the things they are threatening to do if Pakistan does not comply. They can't use drones without the explicit permission of the Pakistani government; that much is clear from the carefully calibrated ways in which the policy first got underway under the Bush-Mush partnership, and expanded considerably under the Barry-Zarry partnership. And they can't use Special Ops without risking considerable blowback from the Pakistani military especially; the last time it happened, the military leadership let them know in no uncertain terms that it was not on.

So if they can't do it, why would they threaten to do it? That was my logic the first time I read the piece. And then I sat back, and reflected. And it dawned on me that looking at the credibility of the threat is probably the wrong prism with which to analyze it.

No, what matters more here is the content of the threat: two very big sticks. The Obama administration has seriously broken with the Bush team on this in a significant way. The threats are louder and more ominous, but the sweet talk is gentler and more wide-ranging. While the Bushies generally cared only about the military status quo in the country, we hear time and again from this administration the potential of a broader strategic partnership. The NYT editorial even referenced Obama's promises of "what one aide described as a partnership of “unlimited potential” in which Washington would consider any proposal Islamabad puts on the table." Such promises lack the credibility of the threats above, perhaps even more so, but they do an adequate job of conveying a sense of urgency that was, I daresay, absent from the Americans before. Bigger sticks, yes, but also bigger carrots. The logic, I think, is that by raising the stakes of a bad strategic choice by the Pakistani military, you increase the likelihood of a good strategic choice.

Of course, all this assumes that this is a choice, which brings me to...

4. Is the Pakistan military not going after the Afghan Taliban because of a lack of willingness or a lack of ability? I've talked about this at length before, but it's not immediately clear to me why the military is not going after the Afghan Taliban at this point in time. The Americans seem to think it's because they don't want to and that they don't consider them a threat; to the contrary, the Americans believe that the Pakistani military thinks of the Afghan Taliban as a strategic ally in its rivalry with India. And certainly, there is little evidence disproving this hypothesis.

On the other hand, it is an hypothesis that is not falsifiable, at least right now. That is because assuming the military even wanted to, it couldn't do so. They are mired in a whack-a-mole war right now, jumping from Swat to the wider Malakand division to the northern areas of FATA (Bajaur, Khyber) to South Waziristan. All these operations have been undertaken against sworn enemies of the Pakistani state and groups involved in the killing of Pakistani civilians. In other words, they have their hands full with anti-Pakistan groups, rendering action against anti-US/NATO groups basically impossible. So as things stand, we simply cannot know if this is a matter of intentions or a matter of capabilities.

One piece of idle speculation: why are we so sure that the Pakistani military cannot turn against the Afghan Taliban for now, and then cultivate them later? To be clear, I am not arguing for this position by any stretch. But I do think we need to consider the military's incentives here.

Consider that the American theory of the military's goals is that they (the military) want an ally in post NATO Afghanistan, and thus are not acting against the Afghan Taliban right now. But why does that ally have to be this particular incarnation of the Afghan Taliban? Is it not at least plausible that if the Pakistani military leadership really did want to exert influence in Afghanistan through a local proxy, that they could cultivate that proxy at a later time? It's not as if they don't have the practice or know-how; hell, they've been doing it for nearly twenty years. Why not go after the Afghan Taliban now, satisfy the Americans, and then make a new Afghan Taliban in 2012 to make everyone's lives miserable?

Make no mistake, such a strategy would make everyone's lives miserable -- both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We've seen this movie before, and we know how it ends. But that's my view, one of a poor pathetic liberal who doesn't understand the world and the way it works. The Pakistani military could, and probably would, see things differently. So why does everybody assume a logic on behalf of the military that may not hold?

Live (Okay, Sort Of Live) Blogging Barack Obama's Afghanistan Speech (Updated Below)

I had to go to a department dinner, so I missed Obama's speech as he delivered it, but thanks to the wonders of technology, I am going to watch it on the NYT website. I will blog my thoughts as I watch it "live". Before we begin, I think I should stipulate for the record that this is Obama's earliest, biggest and dumbest mistake. 30k additional troops for counter-insurgency in a poor, rural country that's been at war for more than thirty years, has no viable central government, and has never been subdued by foreign forces? Right. Anyway, I'm beginning the speech at 10:30 p.m., just so you know where I am during the speech.

10:30 p.m. Man, the cadets at West Point look like they're dressed for an alien movie.

10:31 p.m. "We did not ask for this fight." Ok, fair enough. But you do realize the fight that was started on 9/11/2001 bears no resemblance whatsoever to the war today, right?

10:32 p.m. My friend, al-Qaeda's base may have been in Afghanistan, and they may have gotten sanctuary from the Taliban, but you know where they got their flight training? Florida. In fact the list of training centers for al-Qaeda terrorists in the last ten years include: London, Spain, Indonesia, Germany, the U.S., Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt...and that's just off the top of my head. The safe haven argument doesn't make much sense. But what do I know?

10:34 p.m. Hahaha. Nice job not reliving the Iraq war debate at West Point. Kudos.

10:37 p.m. Here's the nicest thing I can say about this strategy: he's sticking to his word. Anyone who followed the campaign even superficially knew that he wanted to wind down the war in Iraq only to transfer resources to Afghanistan. This is not a surprise.

10:38 p.m. "The status quo is not sustainable". Alright, so we agree on one thing.

10:40 p.m. So he's sending 30,000 troops to bring them back in three years? Does anyone believe that will actually happen? I'm not saying he's lying, I'm just saying he's being disingenuous. Wars have their own momentum. Remember, Rummy and Condi and Cheney thought the U.S. would leave Iraq in a few weeks or months. That was almost seven years ago.

10:42 p.m. His argument is that Central Asia is "vital" to American security because that's where the last attack came from and where, presumably, the next attack is being planned. But what global terrorism has shown is that having a safe haven on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for terrorist attacks. So in what sense are American security interests vital?

10:44 p.m. Poor Lynd...er, sorry, I mean poor Barack.

10:45 p.m. So the objectives are: strengthen the central Afghan government; draw back the influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, advise, assist and train Afghan security forces; encourage competence from the Karzai regime; focus on agriculture.

10:49 p.m. Uh, Barry? You know no Afghan is watching this, right? There's no need to address them directly.

10:50 p.m. Oh, shit. The P-word.

10:51 p.m. Honestly? I know some of my readers are going to bite my head off, but I really liked the Pakistan section. Hit all the right notes, described the situation accurately, suggested the right solutions. Not saying it will work, mind, just saying I liked the words.

10:53 p.m. With the whole this isn't Vietnam/but the status quo won't work either/but a strong and open-ended escalation won't work either, it's clear what he's trying to do: chart a middle ground amongst strawmen position on the extremes. That's the classic Obamaist rhetorical technique.The only problem with this is that war isn't healthcare: middling policies is great politics, but doesn't always make for smart war. You're either all in or all out.

10:56 p.m. Ok, he at least understands that war abroad has real costs at home -- at least that's what I take from the discussion on the cost of the war and the budget deficit.

10:59 p.m. Hillary sighting! Nice.

11:00 p.m. Haha. I love that the U.S. president actually has to "prohibit torture". Good times.

11:01 p.m. Ah, American exceptionalism. I never get tired of hearing it. Listen, guys, seriously: you're like other empires in more ways than you think. Seriously. Just admit it and move on.

11:03 p.m. Bloody hell, he stopped talking about Afghanistan like ten minutes ago -- he's been talking about how great America is since then. Is this really necessary?

11:05 p.m. He closes the speech by staring into the camera and channeling George W. Bush. Seriously, watch that last minute, close your eyes, imagine it's George Bush's voice, and tell me the words don't sound out of place. For better or worse.

Well, that's that. As I said, I think this decision is his worst mistake -- easily -- from a U.S. perspective. From a Pakistani point of view, I'm not 100% sure of the implications to be honest. They could be very bad but they could improve the situation slightly in important ways. I'll probably take a day or two to gather my thoughts and write a proper post then.

UPDATE: This is the problem with liveblogging. While you're busy typing, you end up missing some of what is said. I take back my endorsement of the Pakistan section of his speech, mainly because of the stuff about nukes, and his implication that al-Qaeda could end up in control of a deliverable weapon. It's a stupid and false assertion.

Also, contrast his rhetoric in public with what the CIA is planning in private:

In recent months, in addition to providing White House officials with classified assessments about Afghanistan, the C.I.A. delivered a plan for widening the campaign of strikes against militants by drone aircraft in Pakistan, sending additional spies there and securing a White House commitment to bulk up the C.I.A.’s budget for operations inside the country.

The expanded operations could include drone strikes in the southern province of Baluchistan, where senior Afghan Taliban leaders are believed to be hiding, officials said. It is from there that they direct many of the attacks on American troops, attacks that are likely to increase as more Americans pour into Afghanistan.

“The president endorsed an intensification of the campaign against Al Qaeda and its violent allies, including even more operations targeting terrorism safe havens,” said one American official. “More people, more places, more operations.”

That was the message delivered in recent weeks to Pakistani officials by Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser. But the Pakistanis, suspicious of Mr. Obama’s intentions and his staying power, have not yet agreed.

Well, no shit. The obvious question becomes: where does this end? It started with FATA, it appears to be expanding into Balochistan (if the U.S. has its way). So, again, where does this end? If the U.S. believes they have actionable intelligence on al-Qaeda operatives in Karachi, will they bomb the city with drones? Rural southern Punjab? Urban northern Punjab? Because, let me tell you, the way the U.S. defines "al-Qaeda", al-Qaeda operatives are in each of those places.

Revolution Is Not A Dinner Party

Please watch this Chinese news clip on the whole Tiger Woods thing (via Simmons' twitter):

By the way, the title of the post refers to a quote from Mao, which is the only Chinese phrase I know.

Tom Friedman Thinks People Should Be Grateful When Their Countries Are Bombed And Invaded

I honestly did not want to write a post criticizing Tom Friedman -- mainly because it's too easy, and it's been done to death -- but I have a few minutes of spare time, so I thought: why the hell not?

Please read his description of U.S. conduct in the Muslim world:

Yes, after two decades in which U.S. foreign policy has been largely dedicated to rescuing Muslims or trying to help free them from tyranny — in Bosnia, Darfur, Kuwait, Somalia, Lebanon, Kurdistan, post-earthquake Pakistan, post-tsunami Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan — a narrative that says America is dedicated to keeping Muslims down is thriving.

Although most of the Muslims being killed today are being killed by jihadist suicide bombers in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia, you’d never know it from listening to their world. The dominant narrative there is that 9/11 was a kind of fraud: America’s unprovoked onslaught on Islam is the real story, and the Muslims are the real victims — of U.S. perfidy.

Have no doubt: we punched a fist into the Arab/Muslim world after 9/11, partly to send a message of deterrence, but primarily to destroy two tyrannical regimes — the Taliban and the Baathists — and to work with Afghans and Iraqis to build a different kind of politics. In the process, we did some stupid and bad things. But for every Abu Ghraib, our soldiers and diplomats perpetrated a million acts of kindness aimed at giving Arabs and Muslims a better chance to succeed with modernity and to elect their own leaders.

The Narrative was concocted by jihadists to obscure that.

Actually, beneath the self-serving bullshit that regularly accompanies Friedman's columns, there is a grain of truth there: governments and populations in Muslim and Arab states do not like taking responsibility for their failings, and seek to deflect blame to other people and states. This state of affairs is deplorable, and from a personal perspective, I try to do everything I can to shine a light on the incredible stupidity that results when this modus operandi is employed with the regularity that it is (think Zaid Hamid blaming Pakistan's problems on a Hindu-Zionist-American-Mickey Mouse-Donald Duck conspiracy).

The only problem is that this grain of truth is buried under opinions so stupid that it boggles the mind. In Friedman's view, when people are invaded and bombed, they should be happy about it, because the U.S. really wants to "rescue Muslims" or "free them from tyranny". Torture and indiscriminate bombing should be excused because American soldiers and diplomats "perpetrated a million acts of kindness" (evidently this was not one of the million).

I believe a state as powerful as the U.S. will end up conducting itself in fairly aggressive ways -- that's just the U of C training in me. I also believe a state will try to justify its aggression and dress it up in benevolent language to make it look like they're doing something other than pursuing their national interests (think the White Man's Burden). Up to this point, I can follow the train logically and understand it (even if I don't necessarily like it).

But where I get completely lost is the third step: when the people in charge start believing what they say. Do neocons (the Krauthammer/Kristol crowd) and liberal imperialists (the Friedman crowd) genuinely believe that the world should be grateful when the U.S. bestows upon it the privilege of being invaded? All the evidence suggests: yes, they do. And the truly scary thing about this view is how widespread it is. In the academic world, I either come across directly, or speak to fellow academics who engage with, the Washingon crowd (think tankers, inside-the-Beltway journalists etc). It's actually quite amazing the extent to which these people believe their own bullshit. They really do think the world sees them as they see themselves, and are truly flummoxed when you try to tell them that it doesn't.

Anyway, if you want to see others piling on Friedman's column, read Steve Walt and Glenn Greenwald.

U.S.-Sino Relations In Six Minutes

SNL, you beauty.

Sometimes people outside the U.S. have trouble viewing videos from the websites of the original network, so here's the Youtube version of the same:

Who's Dumber? Sarah Palin Or Her Supporters?

Yikes.



By the way, I finally finished reading the Scahill piece on Blackwater in Pakistan. I will be posting reactions in the next couple days, so stay tuned.