On the economy front, I'm disturbed that there seems to be little long-term thinking on the problems of power and electricity; though I do recall reading about a week ago that the Bhasha dam is now in the news again. Whether or not its plans are consigned to the dustbin of history owing to provincial and ethnic divisions a la the Kalabagh dam -- as I deem likely -- will only be revealed in the future. And I suppose American promises of help on this issue can do little harm, though you never know with us.
I want to get your views on a couple of very specific issues. What are your thoughts on Jinnahpur-gate?
Cyril: Re Swat. If there was a master plan, this wasn't it (regardless of what the army and its acolytes say behind the scenes). The turning point was really Sufi Mohammad's speech on the grassy ground where he denounced everything and anything, other than himself and his followers of course, as kafir and un-Islamic.
The whole thing had been arranged by the government for him to call on Fazlullah to disarm and to support the government's writ - but, legend has it, he played the 'wrong' tape instead over the microphones, one of his old speeches in which he, well, denounced everything and everything other than himself and his followers.
So there was a plan - just not the one we've seen unfold since then.
Jinnahpur - wow, a crazy one. I've written Dawn's editorials on it and related matters and the big question, to my mind and others whose opinions I hold in high esteem, is the question of timing - why now?
No one seems sure yet (and let this be another lesson in unintended consequences when you unleash loose cannons on the electronic media), but I'm not convinced it has more to do with Musharraf and less with Zardari.
Could it be a ploy to push the PPP and PML-N further apart so that constitutional amendments are off the table again? Who benefits most from the status quo? You do the math.
Ahsan: On the turning point of the war front, I'd say there were three factors. In no particular order, they were the anti-democracy, anti-everything speech you reference (though I have to admit, I've never heard of the "wrong tape" theory on this); the Buner incursion, and -- don't laugh -- the Taliban-beating-the-girl video as well as the attack on the Sri Lankan cricketers. I really think the last two episodes had a real galvanizing effect on the population. Now, you may argue that public support has mattered little to the military in its various adventures in the past, and I would agree with you. But I really think those two key moments provided focal points around which the entire country coalesced, and gave momentum toward an armed struggle. That's how I saw it.
On to Jinnahpurgate or rather, Brig. Imtiaz-gate. Perhaps some of our readers might not be fully aware of the situation, so let me provide some details here. If you think I miss something important, please fill in the gaps, or correct me. I then want to make a comment about what this episode says about our political culture and our society writ large.
In the very recent past -- I would say two weeks -- a certain Brigadier Imtiaz (and Naseer Akhtar, no doubt) has fed a media frenzy with some interesting revelations. Brig. Imtiaz was a fairly key player in the military-intelligence establishment during the 1980s and early 1990s. He has made the following claims:
1. During the Zia era in the 1980s, the ISI used, shall we say, extrajudicial measures to clamp down on left-wing groups, trade unions, labor unions and other admittedly bit players in an anti-socialist/secular crusade. Torture, "disappearances" and even murder was common. These claims by Brig. Imtiaz surprise no one; we all knew this already.
2. During the end of Zia's era and the Benazir's first term, the ISI and the military used millions of publicly funded rupees to finance an anti-Benazir coalition, the IJI, of which Nawaz Sharif was the most recognizable symbol. When this campaign failed, and BB actually got elected, they did everything possible to undermine her government, and refused to let her get her hands on Afghan policy, Kashmir policy and nuclear weapons policy. These claims by Brig. Imtiaz surprise no one; we all knew this already.
3. In 1992, as a purported casus belli to launch a military operation against the MQM, the military-intelligence establishment claimed to have found maps of "Jinnahpur", meant to be a separate homeland for Mohajirs, at the headquarters and offices of the MQM. The idea was to demonstrate that the MQM was a treasonous party, wanted secession, and thus had to be dealt with by force -- which they eventually were, in operations where thousands of MQM activists and workers were killed in fake encounters. We are now told from the horse's mouth that there were no such maps, that they were fabricated by IB (another intelligence agency, dealing more with domestic matters), and, as usual, that it was all a load of crap designed only to malign the MQM. Moreover, the claim is made that then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif knew everything there was to know about these plans, and had no problems with them. These claims by Brig. Imtiaz surprise no one; we all knew this already.
Now, these revelations have to be taken with the context that Nawaz Sharif and the PML(N) are, today, very stridently pushing to try former President Musharraf for treason.
So...
The revelations, such as they are, are thought to be accomplishing the following:
1. Reminding people that Nawaz Sharif is no angel, that his role as champion of democracy and freedom and non-interference from the military is a very new one, and that he had no problems accepting money from the ISI to fight against Benazir's election campaign first, and her government second. Moreover, it is meant to show he had little compunction in using force to deal with political opponents domestically.
2. That there is a lot of dirty laundry within Pakistani politics, and if one man goes down for his crimes (Musharraf), there's plenty more where that came from. So those who are pushing for so-called accountability should be careful.
So the conventional wisdom is that this is all a ruse designed by Musharraf, sitting safely in England as we speak, and his minions to ward off the prospect of a trial. But as you point out, it's not the only theory. Your theory says that it is more about Zardari than Musharraf and domestic political alignments; I don't want to put words in your mouth, so maybe our readers will benefit from an explicit account of what you think is going on, and whether it's orchestrated from one actor or not.
I do want to make one general point though.
More than most places, Pakistan has struggled to come to terms with its past. I am not talking about admitting to war crimes (in East Pakistan in 1971) as a society like, say, the Germans have. I am not talking about specific episodes that drift in and out of the public consciousness like the ISI-backed IJI and the role Nawaz Sharif played. I am not talking about partition, and how the entire country is still divided on what Jinnah wanted for us (secularism or not, for example), or why partition happened in the first place (you'd be amazed at the extent to which the academic historical literature is divided on this question).
No, what I am referring to is the fact that we don't even agree on what happened. Most disagreements in the political sphere in other countries focus on what implications to draw from certain events. So after World War I, some Germans thought that being the most powerful country in Europe was a fool's errand, and that trying to accomplish it militarily was impossible, whereas other Germans thought the only mistake they made was giving up too soon, and that if the politicians hadn't betrayed the military, they would have succeeded (the first group was right, the second one ended up in power in the 1930s -- and we know how that turned out). But all Germans agreed they lost the war.
With us, it's completely different. We can't deal with our past because we don't have a common set of understandings from which respectful disagreements arise. Nawaz Sharif and his party have almost literally forgotten the late 1980s and early 1990s. The MQM simply pretends it's not a thuggish party and hasn't been responsible for hundreds of killings, extortion, bribery, and other assorted crimes in Karachi. The PPP actually thinks Benazir was liberal democracy personified. It's not a matter of differing opinions. It's a matter of different facts. Different histories. It's almost like we were subjected to 170 million different history books in school. Everyone's in their own world.
I don't know if I'm making sense. But this whole controversy has given me this sensation, which I've often felt in the past, that we as Pakistanis will go nowhere, and not learn from our past, until we actually agree on what the past actually was.
Cyril: I'd add more, but it's mostly there in Wednesday's leader in Dawn and I will be fleshing it out some more this Friday in my own piece.
About the operation against the MQM during the first Nawaz govt, I'd add there were at least two other big players involved: the president, GIK, and the army chief, Asif Nawaz.
It is enormously complex and messy and we can't be completely sure of what exactly happened on the basis of the current evidence in the public domain - which is precisely the problem you referred to: that we don't ever seem to know anything more than rudimentary facts, if that.
Frankly, in all this nonsense the one sensible (!) suggestion has been Altaf Husain's: form a truth and reconciliation committee and investigate the allegations - and all other controversies, I say.
There is so much that's happened between the various parties that until they sit down and bury some of the ghosts from the past they will never be a match for the establishment/undemocratic forces' divide-and-rule strategy.
Wrap your head around this: the MQM and PMLN are feuding over something that happened in the first Sharif term but they were in govt together again during his second term! And during the PPP's second term in the '90s the MQM was crushed even more violently than in the Sharif crackdown - and now those two parties are back in government together!
So clearly they can work with each other despite brutal histories, but what they can't seem to do is work with each other for more than few months (or a year or so at most) or eschew dirty tricks when not seeing eye-to-eye.
So, maybe if there is some national catharsis of sorts for these parties - a process that will show the world and each other that none of them have clean hands and how often they've been manipulated by the establishment for its own interests - they may learn to genuinely trust each other.
That doesn't mean they have to agree on policies and issues - we're not talking a post-politics phase - but it does mean they may learn to abide by the rules of the game of electoral politics conducted within a constitutional framework.
Will it definitely work? Who knows. But we've tried everything else - maybe it's time we try the warm-and-fuzzy option. We could be in for a pleasant, nay radical, surprise.
The dangers in not trying to change course is apparent today and in your question - AZ and NS potentially embarking on another bitter round of fighting that could dangerously destablise the system again, and all triggered by dragging up ghosts from the early '90s.
A truth and reconciliation process would at least deprive the politicians of some of the weapons they periodically use to inflict damage on each other and, inevitably, themselves.
It's genesis, conventional wisdom has it, lies in the bid by the security establishment to break the hold of the PPP in urban Sindh at least. True perhaps to an extent, but that doesn't tell you much about a party nearly 30 years on.
After all, Sharif was similarly nurtured by the army in the '80s, but look who he wants hanged today and at his troubles with earlier army chiefs in the '90s.
I'm told that people as eminent as Arif Hassan believed in the '90s that the MQM represented an urban political revolution - a positive revolution - led by second- and third-generation immigrants who were finally organising a growing middle class in urban Sindh.
Of course, history has turned out quite differently - though I'd argue that the party has two faces (real to a degree but often caricatureised/exaggerated): the thuggish, mafia-esque side and the cleaner, post-90s more acceptable political face.
One thing that does irk me about the party is its aggravated sense of victimhood. The MQM is always the sufferer in the imagination of its leaders. It is congenitally disliked by the establishment, it has enemies everywhere out to destroy it and it must constantly fend off threats of all sorts to its position.
True perhaps, but what you going to do about it? Nobody likes a whiner.
Recognise also the reality of the extent to which the party has consolidated its hold over Karachi and built up a formidable arsenal (real and metaphorical) over the last decade under Musharraf. It's preposterous. Forget victimhood, the MQM should be strutting like a peacock and have the swagger of a man who knows he's untouchable.
Though, in response to your cricketing friends' claims, I'd say it's a stretch to claim the MQM would not win a single seat - or vote - even if it had a 'cleaner' way of doing politics.
There were certainly questions about the way, say, Farooq Sattar won his seat in February 2008, but there were other seats won that were no-brainers.
And say what you will (though certainly not that tripe about fighting the impending 'Talibanisation' of Karachi), the MQM has secular credentials, or impulses at the very least.
Ahsan: I've always been endlessly fascinated by the MQM. Maybe this is because I grew up in Karachi in the 1990s, but they've always been super interesting to me. The internal contradictions (a highly decentralized and meritocratic party led by a man who has few living enemies), the political agendas (an intensely aggressive, some would say fascistic, secular and ethnic identity), the violence, the dalliances and distances with the military, the restriction to urban Sindh despite a model of politics that can easily be replicated elsewhere -- they're just a really interesting case study on so many levels.
I would agree that the victimhood thing is uber-annoying. I referred to it as needless prickliness in my email but I think the term "martyr complex" does a better job. Incidentally, they're hardly alone in this respect. I just finished reading Steve Coll's excellent book on South Asia from the early 90s, called On the Grand Trunk Road, and he devotes considerable space to both Indira Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto seeing enemies everywhere, seeing half-baked conspiracies behind every closed door -- basically everything you just ascribed to the MQM in your email. If you haven't already read the book, I highly recommend it. And he's such a brilliant and engaging writer too.
I had a chance to read the editorial you wrote on the Brig. Imtiaz/PPP-PML(N) breakdown. I had a couple of questions to ask you about it, but then I decided against it given you'll probably deal with it in greater detail in your Friday column.
So let me ask a couple of personal questions before we wrap this up. Where do you see yourself going in the next ten years? Are you going to go the Ahmed Rashid route (write an investigative book, make a name for yourself in a particular field, and then make gazillions in talks and lectures on the think tank, university and DC circuit)? Are you going to go the Mohammad Hanif route (drift in and out of retirement, write a novel, chill with your kids)? Or, perhaps most entertainingly, are you going to go the Husain Haqqani route (make the right political friends, say the right things, end up in the right capitals of the world)?
Cyril: Ahmed Rashid - I'm not a reporter, so unlikely.
Hanif - I wouldn't know where to begin writing fiction. One of my more shameful secrets is that I know next to nothing about fiction - including his book, which I have yet to finish. He's too decent a chap to ever ask, so I've lost the fear of having to admit as much to him.
HH - bless the good ambassador (one of the lesser known things about the man is that he's a tireless worker) but I don't have, shall we say, his chameleon-like qualities or the ability to re-invent myself every few years.
Ten years from now? I'll settle for reasons to be less sceptical of this place, the direction it is headed in and the people who are trying to run it.
More likely though? Nursing a glass of regret.
Ahsan: Hahaha. On that entirely depressing note, let me thank you on behalf of our readers for your time. Keep writing your excellent columns and providing a clear-eyed view of our nutty country.
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Cyril's columns come out every Friday in Dawn. His columns are conveniently archived on his website linked above.
For those interested, I had one of these public conversations a while ago with Mosharraf Zaidi, another op-ed columnist for a major national daily. Here's part one of that exchange and here's part two.