Does Benazir want the Chief Justice back?

Just a quick post to add to what's already been said by Ahsan and Kabir, I apologize for the grammar in advance.

I just heard Benazir's press conference on Geo-Uk. She's given Musharraf till the 13th of November to declare that he will doff his Uniform on the 15th as promised, otherwise shes promised to take out a "long march" in Rawalpindi (an interesting venue), or in Lahore if Rawalpindi is blockaded by the police. She has also demanded that Musharraf and the Election Commission stick to the timetable for elections (or as close to it as possible), and withdraw the state of emergency.

To state the obvious, those are pretty much item for item the same demands that have been made by the United States thus far.

However, neither the US nor BB have demanded:

1. That Musharraf quit both posts (i.e his position as President as well)

2. That Musharraf reinstate the judges he removed upon declaring the emergency, most notably the Chief Justice .

Personally, I seriously doubt that BB was particularly sorry to see the Chief Justice go. The Chief Justice himself was not particularly constrained by his judicial remit and was often compared to a judicial thana-dar of sorts (though let me qualify that for institutional reasons, that is in no way an endorsement of Musharraf's decision to sack him and the rest of the senior judiciary).

It is therefore possible that BB considered him a serious obstacle/spoiler for any future Government she formed, a likelihood which could be evidenced by her refusal to call for his reinstatement.

If that is the case, and if both BB and the US are, in part, happy to see the back of the Chief Justice, it could help to explain why neither immediatley/instictivley took a hard stance with respect to the Emergency itself, which his dismissal would have necessitated.

Just a further point with respect to the what could follow the emergency. Stephen Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and author of "The Idea of Pakistan", wrote in this article that Musharraf is seeking a quick emergency so as to oust the judges, confirm his presidency and then:

"if things go as well as they can, carefully controlled elections will be held, Benazir will come to office, Musharraf will be able to retire from the army, leaving it in the hands of close and trusted advisors, and the army and Benazir, together, will tackle the extremist problem."

He then identifies two problems with this "reasonably rosy scenario".

"First, the terrorists and insurgents of Pakistan may not cooperate, and surrender meekly to Pakistani forces. Recent battles over the Lal Masjid, in FATA, and now in Swat show that there is a large and dedicated cadre of true militants who are more than a match for the Pakistan army in a tactical environment. The PPP is weakest where the militants are strongest, and cannot be counted on to provide the political guidance to tackle them. The militants are not interested in ministerial bungalows in Islamabad, they want to turn Pakistan into a base from which they can attack other soft Muslim and Western states (and India), and even lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Musharraf may have sidelined the journalists, lawyers, and judges, but he has yet to demonstrate that Pakistan has the will, or the capacity, to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency strategy. The recent operations in Swat, once a tranquil backwater but now under the control of Islamist fanatics, was done, according to press reports, without any regard for the refugees and innocent civilians; if past experience is any guide, the Pakistan army’s operations will merely serve to increase recruitment to the ranks of the militants.

Second, bringing Benazir in to the “system” will be bitterly opposed by Musharraf’s civilian supporters. They detest her populist approach, they have no rejoinder to the developmental and educational agenda that she has set out, and only talk of how many roads and bridges Pakistan has built under this and previous military regimes. It is hard to imagine that they will work with a Bhutto government, and she may find it hard to work with them. As one Pakistan general remarked to me several years ago, the first preference of Pakistani politicians is that they govern the state, their second preference is that the military rules."

True, but both of the obstacles mentioned above existed pre-emergency, and would have posed a problem even in the realisation of the pre-emergency rosy scenario of a Mush-BB deal.

In my opinion, if the post- emergency "rosy scenario" comes through the costs of the emergency will likely be mostly long term, in terms of the institutional precedent set and the serious damage done to a decapitated and neutered judiciary. The short term costs will be that people are less likely to back either BB or Mush, the only two leaders in Pakistan who are keen to address the issue of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy. The short term benefits, if any, are that the next government will not have to deal with an interventionist judiciary and an ambitious Chief Justice.