The Difference Between A Weak Government And A Weak State

One of the things that has bothered me about Western coverage of Pakistan since Zardari's election and, in particular, since the Bombay attacks a few weeks ago, is the conflation of two very different terms: a weak government, and a weak state.

For example, here is the New York Times editorial last week:

Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, must face up to his country’s involvement — whether official or nearly so. We know his new civilian government is weak, and he may not be able to accede to New Delhi’s demands that all suspects be turned over to India for prosecution.

I don't know who the "we" in that statement is - I suppose it refers to the NYT's editorial board - but "we" happen to be wrong.

Asif Zardari's civilian government is not weak. To the contrary, he is the single strongest civilian leader of this country since his father-in-law, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He is arguably more powerful than even President Zia-ul-Haq was at his peak, and he is certainly more powerful than Musharraf was at his. To see why, we need to delve into Pakistan's internal political structure.

Historically, there have been three major power brokers within Pakistan's political, if not geographical, space. First and foremost is the Army. For reasons too complicated to get into at this point - though the interested reader should consult Ayesha Jalal's fantastic book on the subject - the military exerts enormous influence in Pakistan. The second major power broker is what can be broadly construed as the "business and feudal community". The third is Uncle Sam.

A relatively recent addition to this set of players that matter is what is commonly referred to as "civil society", though in Pakistan's case it would be more accurate to call this new group "the media and the lawyers". This group set off a chain of events in March 2007 that ultimately resulted in Musharraf's resignation as President in the summer of 2008.

So we have four groups that matter in Pakistan; the discerning reader will have noticed, I am sure, that I did not include the religious right (which is good for a few Friday sermons and Danish cartoon protests but not much else), mainstream political parties (generally devoid of souls or consciences), or the middle and lower classes (whose political allegiances almost always full into predictable ethnic and provincial breakdowns, thus affording them little credibility of desertion). Where does Zardari stand with each of these groups?

Let's start with the military. The Army under Asfhaq Kayani has shown an increasing willingness to step into the background on political issues, and allow greater subordination to civilians. Whether this is a tactical or strategic move is unclear - at least to me - but the point remains: Kayani has given Zardari more leeway than any General has given any civilian leader I can recall. Is the military completely subservient? No, of course not - and it would be foolish to expect it to be. But baby steps are being taken.

The second and third are no-brainers. Zardari is of the business and feudal community. He is one of them, and speaks their language. Uncle Sam is also willing to give him a chance, mainly because (a) there seems to be military-fatigue in D.C. and (b) Zardari does everything asked of him.

What about the fourth? This process has been completely hidden from view for those who don't pay attention to Pakistani politics on a daily basis, but Zardari's neutralization of the lawyers and their political representatives as been a political masterstroke. I can't even recall the last time someone mentioned the words "Iftikhar Chaudhry". Whether or not you countenence the means or the ends of Zardari's political acumen, there is no doubting his adroitness on these issues. Dude can play this game.

So, in a very basic and fundamental way, Zardari's government is not weak. It is in fact very strong. He is faced with a pliant judiciary, a patient military, a supportive U.S., and a majority in parliament.

The Pakistani state, on the other hand, is embarassingly weak. State strength refers to the amount of legitimate control the state exercises on its territory. The war against the Taliban in the north west of the country tells you all you need to know on that front. One can also consider Pakistan's abysmal tax-to-GDP ratio, a traditional marker of state strength in the poli sci literature because it gets at the ability of agents of the state to coerce citizens (for those interested, this article by Evan Lieberman explores the causes of a variation in the ability to collect taxes in South Africa and Brazil). Simply put, if the state can't establish it's writ in meaningful ways on the territory it purports to control, then it is a weak state. Pakistan falls under this category.

But please don't confuse Pakistan being weak for Zardari or his government being weak. They are separate and distinct analytical propositions, and should be treated as such.